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Abstract
Many quality signals, both private and public, have been used to foster the development of
food quality in the agro-food markets, mainly brands and common labels. Previous research
has typically focused on either brand or common label efficiency independently, while in
many instances both signals coexist. Agricultural products pairing brand names and certified
labels, such as indications of origin, are indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese, Scottish
whiskeys and most of the French wines). The objective of our paper is to take into account
this coexistence by empirically analyzing the complementarity and/or substitutability that
may exist between labels and brands. To do so, we estimate an original multinomial probit
model of complementarity that we test on a database of the quality signaling strategies from
993 small French co-operatives. Our main result shows that there is a clear interaction
effect between brand and label signal strategies, but more as a substitution effect than as a
complementary one.
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1 Introduction
Consumers demand for quality food has been increasingly drawing attention throughout the world,
particularly in industrialized countries (Braham, 2003; Vanhonacker et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2011).
Many quality signals can be used, both private (brand) and common (label), to foster the devel-
opment of quality food in the market (Crespi and Marette, 2003; Lence et al., 2007). Previous
research has typically focused on either brand or common label efficiency independently, while
in many instances both signals coexist. Agricultural products pairing brand names and certified
labels, such as indications of origin, are indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese, Scottish
whiskeys and most of the French wines) and the globalization of the agro-food industry seems to
foster its development (Yue et al., 2006; Boizot-Szantai et al., 2005).
Our paper offers the first attempt to empirically test for this coexistence by estimating the com-
plementary effect that may exist between labels and brands. First, we develop empirical models
to test for complementarity between both signals. Since Arora (1996), it is usually considered that
complementary between different practices can be estimated using a reduced-form (bivariate pro-
bit). However, unobserved heterogeneity may first bias the estimates. To overcome this problem,
we use exclusion restriction and indirect test of complementarity by implementing a multinomial
logit model. Unobserved heterogeneity may also make incoherent the discrete response model
of the reduced-form approach (Miravette and Pernias, 2010)1. To avoid this incoherence prob-
lem, we estimate a multinomial probit model to recover the structural parameters by separating
complementarity from unobserved heterogeneity.
Second, to estimate the reduced and structural form models of complementarity between quality
signals we use a sample of 993 small French co-operatives. The co-operatives may choose between
four strategies of quality signaling: no signal, label only, brand only, and a mixed signal (label and
brand). The question we address is then if the mixed signal is due to complementarity, i.e. the
joint adoption of two signals (label and brand) is due to the net gain generated by the combination
of signals, or to unobserved heterogeneity between co-operatives.
Our estimations show two main results. First, the estimation of the structural model using a multi-
nomial probit approach exhibits a clear effect: there is a robust interaction between label and brand
variables, but the interaction is negative. This implies that both signals are more substitutable
than complementary. Second, using a reduced-form approach (bivariate probit) generates at least
biased estimates due to unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, we get a result of complementarity (the
correlation parameter between errors is positive) while the indirect test of complementarity run
on the multinomial logit estimation provides no clear evidence of complementarity.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. In section 2, we provide elements of context
on small French co-operatives and their quality signaling strategies. In section 3, we present and
1The discrete response model is incoherent because it is not possible to associate any realization of the vector of
error terms with a unique combination of strategies. To avoid such incoherence problem in a bivariate probit, any
complementarity among strategies should be excluded so that the estimated correlation coefficient is only evidence
of correlation among unobserved returns of each strategy.
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discuss the complementary effect and the empirical models to test for this effect. Section 4 presents
the database and the different variables used in the test. Section 5 discusses and comments the
results of the empirical models on complementarity or substitutability between labels and brands.
Section 6 gives some concluding remarks.
2 Background on small French co-operatives
Despite the general trend of growth in the size of agricultural cooperatives and agro-industrial firms,
small co-operatives continue to play a significant role in farming activities in France. Indeed, even
if the 1,500 small co-operatives represent less than 1% of the agri-food products, they make a total
sales turnover of 3.6 billion euros, and are the first intermediary of over 100, 000 small farmers.
Small co-operatives are then closely engaged in the farmers production and marketing strategic
choices. Co-operatives are heterogenous in their organizational structure, the type of products
they sold and their markets (2.1), as well as in their quality signaling strategies (2.2).
2.1 Organizational structure, products and markets
Recall that an agricultural co-operative is a legal category of society, different from civil and
commercial companies since it is a non-profit organization. The main feature of a small co-
operative is its small size. That is, a small co-operative is defined as a co-operative with less
than 10 employees. On average, the small co-operatives in France have less than four-full-time
equivalent employees (see table 1 for some statistics). However, we observe a large variability
among the co-operatives since some of them have no employees, while others are at the threshold
of 10 employees. Due to this scarce labor factor, farmers - as members of the co-operative - carry
out a large number of jobs, particularly in seasonal periods of intense activity. There is also a large
variability in the number of members (from one to ten) as well as in the sales turnover. Indeed, if
50% of of the small cooperative have a total sales turnover less than 1. 2 millions €, 25% of the
processing co-operatives realize more than 2.5 millions € while 25% of wholesaling co-operatives
have a turnover higher than 4.3 millions €. Moreover, 10% of the co-operatives realize 50% of
the sales turnover in the wholesaling activity. That is, the co-operatives having the largest sales
turnover are wholesalers2.
To perform their intermediary function, co-operatives as non-profit organizations face also low eq-
uity levels and high marketing costs (Hansmann, 1996; Cook and Iliopoulos, 2000). To circumvent
this problem, small co-operatives may choose different governance mechanisms. First, to benefit
2This can be partly explained by the fact that less than ten number of employees is not the only constraint
that define a small cooperative. There is also a threshold of total sales under which a co-operative is considered as
“small”. This threshold is not the same for the processors and for the wholesalers: 5 millions € for processors and
38 millions € for wholesalers.
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from economies of scale and having access to some heavy equipments (building, logistic facilities,
...), co-operatives may be an associate or a member of an union of cooperatives (Filippi et al.,
2006). 40% of small co-operatives are members or associates of an union of co-operatives. Second,
to reduce its marketing costs by selling directly its products a small co-operative can take the con-
trol of a subsidiary firm that has a direct access to market (Hendriksen and Bijman, 2002). This
strategy is developed by 15% of the co-operatives, notably those with the highest sales turnover.
Small co-operatives sell also different products and have access to different markets. First, if mainly
process and/or sell beverage (48%), particularly wine (85% of the beverages), and dairy products
(28%), there is a slight difference between wholesaling co-operatives (63% of the whole sample)
and processing co-operatives (37% of the whole sample). Wholesalers are specialized in wine and
dairy products (respectively, 60% and 25% of the whole sample), while processors have a more
diversified portfolio of products, e.g. the share of the first three types of product sold is quite the
same: milk, eggs and oil (25%), grain and animal feed (20%), fruit and vegetables (17%).
Second, small co-operatives mainly sell local products in local and regional markets but some of
them have access to export markets. Indeed, more than three-quarter have exclusively regional
customers and 86% of them make more than 50% of their sales turnover in the same marketing
channel (the first marketing channel is the co-operative network (30%)). But small co-operatives
do not sell only to local markets since 20% of the sales turnover are realized with other regions
in France and 7% of the co-operatives export their products to other countries for 6% of the total
sales. Exports are mainly oriented to the EU markets and, to a lesser extent, to markets outside
of the EU borders. The exporting co-operatives are among the largest ones, with a median sales
turnover double than the one of the cooperatives selling exclusively to the domestic market.
- insert Table 1 -
2.2 Quality signals: public labels and private brands
The livelihood of small French farmers depend on their access to markets, and more particularly
to their access to “niche” markets where quality signals may generate some value (Braham, 2003;
Aubert and Perrier-Cornet, 2010). To signal quality, the cooperative, as a marketing intermediary
acting on behalf of its members, may use different quality signals: label, brand, or a mix signal
where label and brand are jointly adopted. Note these three quality signals are managed, owned
(brand) or co-owned (labels) by cooperatives and not by their members (farmers).
Labels are common signals of quality adopted by different cooperatives. In France and in other
European countries, these labels refer to public labels regulated by the State and the European
Commission. They can be Geographical Indications such as PDO or PGI3 (AOC, IGP, ...) and
3In the case of PGI it suffices that one stage of the production process is carried out in the defined area, while
in the case of a PDO, all stages of production must take place in this area.
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cooperatives in the same geographical area are co-owner of the GI4. They make decisions regarding
their products and a consortium is often created to enforce the standards imposed by the IG
system. It act as a third party supervisor that includes verification of origin, quality, food safety
and sometimes marketing functions. Public labels can also be used to signal other dimensions of
the product than geographical indication, e.g. organoleptic quality of the product (Label Rouge)5
or the environmental-friendly production practices adopted by the farmer (organic farming, AB).
In contrast, brands are private quality signals since the cooperative has the exclusive ownership
of the signal and ensure alone its management and bears all the costs. The brand is more often
the name of a product, e.g. “Pates du Lauragais” (Lauragais Pasta) than the name of a store. If
there is often a clear reference to a geographical indication in the brand name (e.g. Lauragais6 in
“pates du Lauragais”) since small cooperatives mainly market the local products of their members,
brands are distinct from IGs because they are private and thus there is no public certification or
regulation of the geographical indication7.
Our definition of labels and brands is very similar to the two ways of labelling geographical indi-
cations (see Sven and Caswell, 2008; Marette et al., 2008). The first way is the European model
where geographical indication labelling is done through public labels (IGs). The second one is the
United States model, where geographical indication labelling is done through trademark or brand
name system.
In our sample, 71 % of the small co-operatives adopt a quality signal. The different quality signals
chosen by the co-operatives are distributed as follows: (i) 29% of small co-operatives use no quality
signal; (ii) 48% of them use labels only; (iii) 5% use brands only; and (iv) 18% of the co-operatives
use a mixed signal strategy by adopting both signals. Among the different public labels, IGs (AOC
and PGI) are predominant (81% of the labels; see table 2). Those signals are especially developed
for wine and cheese since 79% of dairy products and 64% of alcoholic beverages are sold with an
IG. Other labels hold a significant position, particularly the organic farming (AB), even if this
strategy of adopting more than one label is less frequent in our database8.
4In the US, certification mark laws protect individual products based upon their origin or region of production.
A certification mark is defined as “Any word, name, [...] used or intended for use in commerce with the owner’s
permission by someone other than its owner, to certify regional or other geographical origin [...] performed by
members of a union or other organization” (USPTO, 2003). As in the EU GIs system, any producer/ organization
who meets the certification mark is entitled to use the mark. In contrast, there is no certification of the origin and
no supervision system of quality (Marette et al., 2008).
5The Label Rouge certifies that processed and unprocessed food or non-food agricultural products have specific
organoleptic or sensorial quality, which distinguish them from products and foodstuffs normally sold. This signal
is very common for meat and poultry.
6Lauragais is a region in the south of Toulouse.
7The French brand system is very similar to the US trademark system defined as “any word, name, symbol,
device [...] to identify and distinguish the goods of one seller from goods sold by others, and to indicate the source of
goods. In short, a trademark is a brand name (USPTO, 2003)”. An example of trademarks in the US, very similar
to the brand “Pates du Lauragais”, is the brand name “Cuties California Clementine” for Clementines citrus from
farms in California owned by Sun Pacific Producers.
8Among the 65% of co-operatives adopting at least one label, only 15% have more than one label (see table 2)
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- insert Table 2 -
Branding is much less common since it concerns less than a quarter of small co-operatives (22%).
Very few co-operatives choose to hold only a brand signal (5% of the whole sample and 25% of
those adopting brand) since brand is primarily associated with a label (18% of the whole sample
and 75% of the co-operatives that choose the brand signal). Co-operatives choosing a mix signal
are mainly wine making processors (75%) and are not very geographically anchored (35% realize
less than 50% of total sales in the same region). In average, they have a higher total sales turnover
and are among the most exporting co-operatives (44% that export inside EU borders and 12%
outside EU borders).
For those co-operatives exporting outside European borders, the development of brands and mix
signals in France is strategic, particularly in the wine industry (Yue et al., 2006; Boizot-Szantai et
al., 2005). For example, since the protection of property rights in food products is not the same
in Europe and in the US (public labels (IGs) vs certification marks), an exporting co-operative
must have or create a trademark/ certification mark (depicting the place of origin for the product
through a brand name). This can be done by choosing a brand only or by adding a brand to
the public label (mix signal). But this implies a slight change since what is important in the
mark system is the linkage between the owner and its product; the geographic link is secondary.
Therefore, the european product sold in the US looses its IG status and becomes partly generic.
Notice that this strategy of protecting only brand name and not the origin by itself is rational
because product origin is less important to consumers in the US (Marette et al., 2008; Anders and
Caswell, 2008).
2.2.1 Related literature on food quality signaling
Quality signaling is widespread for food and agricultural products, as these products are subject
to market failures due to asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970). In an asymmetric information
context, the firm is supposed to know the good attributes that consumers can only determine
through search or experience or that they cannot determine at all (Darby and Karni, 1973). This
problem impacts negatively on the market: the quality of total supply drops and higher quality
goods are driven out of the market due to adverse selection effect. In response to the unfair
competition from firms who sell lower quality goods at the same price, the firm maintaining the
quality of its goods can adopt a private brand to create the reputation of being a “high quality
firm” (Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1983).
If a brand system can be an efficient mechanism for signaling quality, its cost can be prohibitive for
small individual firms and/or small co-operatives in agriculture and food production. Small firms
or co-operatives can then be a member of a “club” to achieve the critical mass required for label
certification through a common public label. Allowing collusion may indeed improve general welfare
by enabling these firms to cover the fixed costs of quality development and certification (Marette
and Crespi, 2003; Lence et al., 2007; Me´rel, 2009). In many European countries, this common
6
labeling was mainly done with geographically based public labels, or geographical indications (GI)
such as PGI (Protected Geographical Indications) and PDO (Protected Designation of Origin),
where quality attributes are presumed to be linked to the specific geographic origin of the good
produced. This is generally referred to as quality-origin nexus or terroir 9.
There is some evidence that common public labeling, as an institutionalization of a collective
reputation, enables to generate price premium for firms (Thiedig and Sylvander, 2000; Loureiro
and McCluskey, 2000). For instance, Loureiro and McCluskey (2000) analyzed the consumer
willingness to pay for GI public labels and show that when collective reputation is good, a GI
is a powerful tool to promote quality and obtain a price premium10. However, GIs have also
shortcomings since they may not necessarily prevent free riding in collective reputation. Winfree
and McCluskey (2005) show that with positive collective reputation and no supervision system
there is an incentive to firms to free ride, i.e. to extract rents by producing a lower quality level
(Chambolle and Giraud-He´raud, 2005). Thus, as shown by Landon and Smith (1997, 1998), it
can be efficient to use both collective and individual reputations to solve this problem by having
recourse to a mixed signal (label and brand).
There is a burgeoning theoretical literature dealing with this issue of complementarity or concurrent
use between public labels (GIs) and private brands (trademarks). Menapace and Moschini (2012),
extending the model of Shapiro (1983) to reflect in a competitive market both collective (public
GIs) and firm-specific (private trademarks) reputations, show that GIs and trademarks turn out
to be complementary signals of quality. Indeed, if GIs reveal information regarding the origin of a
product, they can also reduce costs of building reputation by constraining moral hazard behavior.
Therefore, GI certification may improve welfare compared with a situation where only private
trademarks would be available to firms. Costanigro et al. (2012), following Tirole (1996) and
Winfree and McCluskey (2005), go one step further and analyze the conditions under which both
public labels (common reputation) and private brands (private reputation) may coexist.
To our knowledge there is no empirical work testing for the coexistence between label and brand.
Our paper is then the first that aims to: (i) develop an empirical model to test for complementar-
ity/substitutability between quality signals (section 3); (ii) test for complementarity using a small
French co-operative database on quality signaling (section 4 and section 5).
9Terroir, a French term for “taste of place”, refers to a causal relationship between agronomic conditions,
craftsmanship and a product distinct quality (Giovannucci et al., 2009).
10Bonnet and Simioni (2001) show in contrast that consumers do not place significant value on the PDO labeled
French Camembert, and that brand appears to be more relevant in the consumer’s evaluation of alternative Products.
Gergaud and Ginzburgh (2008) find also no significant value on the PDO labeled Bordeaux wine.
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3 Testing for complementarity
3.1 The theoretical approach
In order to test for complementarity of labels and brands we apply an empirical strategy that
is based on the theory of supermodularity. This theory of supermodularity was mathematically
developed by Topkis (1978), and first introduced in industrial economics by Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) to explain innovation adoption in firms.
In the context of supermodularity, two signals are complementary if: (i) adopting one signal does
not preclude adopting the other; (ii) whenever it is possible to implement each signal separately,
the sum of the profit to do just one or the other is not greater than the profit of doing both
together. More formally, consider a market with n small co-operatives deciding whether or not to
adopt common labels (l) and brands (b). Each signal can be adopted or not by the co-operative
i = 1, ..., n. That is, l = 1 if the co-operative adopts a common label, 0 otherwise; similarly b = 1
if the co-operative adopts a brand, 0 otherwise. The payoff function pii(l, b) is supermodular and l
and b are complements if
pii(1, 1)− pii(0, 1) ≥ pii(1, 0)− pii(0, 0) (1)
That is to say, adding a signal while the other signal is already adopted has a higher incremental
effect on performance (pii) than choosing the signal in isolation.
3.2 The empirical models
Athey and Stern (1998) show that the problem of testing for complementarity can be tackled
using two approaches. First, the direct approach involves using a production function to deter-
mine the effect of choosing particular combinations of innovation strategies on a firm’s innovative
performance (Belderbos et al., 2006; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006; Mohnen and Ro¨ller, 2005).
Using this approach allows for a direct test of the complementarity constraints, by testing multiple
inequality constraints simultaneously (Mohnen and Ro¨ller, 2005).
The direct approach, however, requires a measure of the innovation performance, which is not
always available. When we do not have such a measure, we must use an indirect approach: the
adoption approach. This tests for a positive correlation between different innovation strategies
conditional on a vector of exogenous variables X. More precisely, it involves examining firm
simultaneous decisions in a bivariate model and analyzing cross-equation correlation in the error
terms, conditional on firm characteristics (Arora and Gambardella, 1990).
Testing for correlation to infer complementarity derives from the theoretical approach on comple-
mentarity presented above. To show this, suppose that the previous payoff function pii(.) depends
also on a vector of exogenous variables (X), and assume that pii(l, b,X) is supermodular in (l, b).
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Then the optimal configuration of signals S∗(l(X), b(X)) is monotone non-decreasing in X (Mil-
grom and Roberts, 1990). As shown by Arora (1996), this implies that if a pair of signals (l, b) is
complementary then the signals will be correlated when there is heterogeneity in X across firms
(cross-sectional study). A bivariate probit regresses the non-exclusive quality signals l and b on
assumed exogenous variables (X) but takes the correlation between them explicitly into account.
This model can be written as follows:
l
∗
i = β
1Xi + ε
1
i , li
{
= 1 if l
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
(2)
b
∗
i = β
2Xi + ε
2
i , bi
{
= 1 if b
∗
i > 0
= 0 otherwise
(3)
where l
∗
i and b
∗
i are latent variables. The errors are such that
E(ε1) = E(ε2) = 0;V (ε1) = V (ε2) = 1;Cov(ε1, ε2) = ρ
The main intuition of the bivariate probit model is the following: in the presence of complemen-
tarity, a variable that affects only one of the signals directly, say l, appears as significant in both
regressions, since complementarity induces an indirect effect from this variable on the adoption of
b. That is, the indirect approach gives an indication of complementarity based on the assumption
that the actual choice of the chosen signal maps the co-operative optimal decision.
The indirect approach encounters however two difficulties. First, unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween different co-operatives could bias the estimation results and lead to either accepting the
hypothesis of complementarity while non-complementarity exists, or to rejecting the complemen-
tarity hypothesis when activities are in fact complementary. In order to account for this unobserved
heterogeneity, it is recommended to use an exclusion restriction that directly impacts one of the
signals, but not the other. Indeed, suppose that an increase in Xk increases only activity s
1 di-
rectly. But because of complementarity between activities s1 and s2, Xk will indirectly increases
activity s2. Therefore, s2
∗
will be non decreasing in Xk in the presence of complementarity (Athey
and Stern, 1996). That is, if there is complementarity between two different signals there will be
a positive effect on the combined use of both signals (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). We imple-
ment this indirect test of complementarity, or “reduced-form test” (Athey and Stern, 1998), by
estimating a multinomial logit model for the mutually exclusive signals: none, label only, brand
only, both (mix signal).
The second difficulty is more severe since the estimation of a coherent bivariate probit model leads
to exclude any complementary effect. Indeed, as shown by Arora (1996), the indirect approach
supposes that the innovation strategies are continuous variables, whereas decisions on innovations
are discrete in most common situations (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). But the extension to the
case of binary variables by using a bivariate probit (Cassiman and Veuglers, 2006) makes the
discrete response model incoherent (Miravette and Pernias, 2010). That is, it is not possible to
associate any realization of the vector of error terms with a unique combination of strategies.
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To avoid such incoherence problem in a bivariate probit, any complementarity among strategies
should be excluded so that the estimated correlation coefficient is only evidence of correlation
among unobserved returns of each strategy.
Using a multinomial probit solves this problem since it becomes possible to estimate separately a
correlation coefficient in the error terms, to capture the unobserved returns, and a parameter of
complementarity (Gentzkow, 2007; Fares, 2013). In a multinomial probit, the co-operative makes
a choice k on exclusive quality signals. The four exclusive choices are: k = 0 when the co-operative
neither adopts common labels nor brands (li = 0, bi = 0); k = 1 when the co-operative chooses a
common label but does not adopt a brand signal (li = 1, bi = 0); k = 2 when it does not choose li
but chooses bi (li = 0, bi = 1); and k = 3 when it chooses both signals (li = 1, bi = 1). Then, the
payoff function to be maximized can be written as follows
piki (li, bi) = (ν
0
i + η
0
i ) + li(ν
1
i + η
1
i ) + bi(ν
2
i + η
2
i ) + libiθ (4)
The payoff has observable and unobservable components. The observable component associated
with common label (ν1i ) and brand (ν
2
i ) are a function of user characteristics. That is, νi =
βkzi where zi is the vector of explanatory variables describing individual and alternative specific
characteristics and βk are coefficients to be estimated. The random component ηk of unobservable
characteristics, related with decision k, has zero mean and covariance matrix
∑
= σki > 0, ∀k. If
we normalize the payoff by taking k = 0 as the reference, we get

pi0i = 0
pi1i = ν˜
1
i + η˜
1
i
pi2i (li, bi) = ν˜
2
i + η˜
2
i
pi3i = θ + [ν˜
1
i + ν˜
2
i ] + [η˜
1
i + η˜
2
i ]
(5)
with piki = pi
k
i −pi0i , ν˜ki = νki −ν0i and η˜ki = ηki −η0i . We know that there is complementarity between
two signals when the profit of adopting quality signals jointly (k = 3) is greater than the value of
adopting them separately (k = 1 or k = 2). Using (1), we have
pi3i + pi
0
i > pi
1
i + pi
2
i
From the system (5), this can be rewritten
θ = pi3i − [pi1i + pi2i ] > 0 (6)
That is, there is complementarity (substitutability) when the constant term θ is positive (nega-
tive)11.
11The identification of the multinomial probit model is however tenuous unless exclusion restrictions are present,
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4 Data and variables
Our data comes from a national survey of 1,500 small French agricultural co-operatives conducted
in 2005 by the Ministry of Agriculture12. This periodical survey aims to study the economic
conditions of small agricultural co-operatives processing and marketing excluded from the SCEES13
annual business survey. From the exhaustive sample of 1,500 surveyed co-operatives, 993 answered
every question14.
4.1 Test variables
The dependent variables in our empirical models are the different quality signal strategies of the
small co-operatives. The latter may choose (i) no quality signal (NSIG); (ii) label only (LABEL);
(iii) brand only (BRAND); or (iv) a mixed signal by adopting both signals (LABRAND).
Different variables may explain the quality signaling strategy. The first driver is the size of the
co-operative since a larger co-operative may adopt (costly) quality signals. The variable used to
define the size of a small co-operative is its number of employees. We build a variable indicating
the number of employees in the co-operative (EMP). Due to the scarce labor factor, farmers - as
members of the co-operative - carry out a large number of jobs, particularly in seasonal periods of
intense activity. Thus, we add a variable MEM indicating the total number of members. Another
variable used as a proxy of the size is the turnover. The continuous variable TURN indicates the
log of turnover (millions of euros) realized by the co-operative.
The second driver that may explain the quality signaling strategy is the governance of the co-
operative (Cook and Sykuta, 2001). Union of co-operatives membership or association is indicated
by the dummy variable, UNION. As a member of an union, the small co-operative may have less
decision power on its own signaling strategy and thus follows the common labeling strategy of the
union. In contrast, the small co-operative may increase its decision power by holding a subsidiary.
We build a dummy variable SUBSID indicating when the co-operative has a subsidiary firm.
The third set of variables that may explain the choice of a quality signal is the market structure.
First, small co-operatives have a local anchorage because of the location of their members. We
i.e. there are some alternative-specific attributes which should enter only the profit associated with one alternative
and not the others (Keane, 1992). In the implementation of the multinomial probit, our estimations of βki , θ and
∑
are obtained through exclusion restriction. Without exclusion restriction, high probability of choosing both signals
(k = 3) may be because of high θ or large covariance between η˜1i and η˜
2
i . Then, it is not possible to separate
complementarity and unobserved heterogeneity.
12Enqueˆte sur les petites coope´ratives agricoles et forestie`res, 2005.
13Service centrale des enqueˆtes et des e´tudes statistiques (Central office for statistical surveys and studies).
14To build the database, we used the full information from the survey. Note that we also tested for a selection bias
between the two categories of cooperatives, those in the study and those omitted because they have not answered
every question. We find no systematic differences between both categories.
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add a dummy variable (LT50INREG) which equals one when the co-operative makes less than
50% of its turnover in the region. Export market represents 3% of total sales, mainly for the EU
markets, and 44% of total sales exported have recourse to brands and public labels. We build two
continuous variables for the exporting co-operatives: (i) the percentage of total sales from export
within the EU (EXINEU); and (ii) the percentage of total sales from export outside of the EU
(EXOUTEU).
We control for the different kind of channels, according to whether the co-operative sells its product
to the co-operative marketing network (CN), supermarkets (SUPER), retailers (RET), whole-
salers (WS), or hotels and restaurants (OTHER HOT). 86% of small co-operatives use only one
marketing channel. We build a variable that equals one when the co-operative makes less than
50% of its turnover with the same marketing channel (LT50SM). And there is a large difference
in the marketing channels depending on the quality signal chosen. For instance, while 16% of the
co-operatives using a brand signal have recourse to supermarkets, only 4% of those having a label
sell to supermarkets.
The type of activity and products sold can also explain the signaling strategy. To account for
the different effect of the processing and the wholesaling activities, we create PC (processing co-
operatives) and WSI (wholesaling co-operatives) dummies. To analyze more precisely the impact
of the different categories of product, we build five dummy variables representing the main types of
product: (i) beverage, mainly wine (BEV); (ii) cereals (CER), (iii) fruit and vegetables (FVEG);
(iv) meat (MEAT) and (v) milk, eggs and oil (MILKOIL).
- insert Table 3 -
5 Results and interpretations
We explain the quality signal strategies by estimating first a bivariate probit and a multinomial
logit (4.1). Then, we provide a multinomial probit robust estimation of complementarity (4.2).
5.1 The bivariate probit
With the estimation of the bivariate probit model, we start with an investigation of the correlation
between both quality signals (label and brand) conditional on size and governance characteristics
of the co-operative as well as the market structure variables. Label and brand are defined as
non-exclusive quality signals, i.e. it is possible that the co-operatives may use both.
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The results for the bivariate probit estimations are presented in table 3. We estimate first a
bivariate probit model without endogeneity correction (model 1), then we estimate different models
to treat for endogeneity biais (models 2, 3, 4; see appendix for details). The first important finding
is that there is a significant positive relationship between label and brand signals as indicated by
the positive and significant correlation coefficient ρ. And this result is robust to endogeneity bias
correction. This suggests that label and brand signals are likely to occur in combination and hence
is a first indication of complementarity.
To explain this possible complementary effect between labels and brands, we need to analyze
the different variables that have a significant effect on the adoption of label and brand signals.
Concerning the size and governance variables, the small co-operatives that have a higher number of
employees (EMP), turnover (Turn) and, are members or associate of a larger co-operative (Union),
generally choose preferably a common label. In contrast, the co-operatives that have both higher
employees and members (MEM) choose a brand strategy.
This may suggest a strong contrast between: (i) small co-operatives that have a “cooperative”
strategy of growth by developing their relationships and organizational proximities with bigger co-
operatives, and thus choose a common signal like a label; and (ii) co-operatives that have a “selfish”
strategy of growth with more employees and members and develop their own quality signal, i.e.
brand. The dummy variable PROC (processing activity) help to control for this heterogeneity
between co-operatives15. We observe the same difference for the different products: selling dairy
products (MILKOIL) increases the probability of adopting a common label, while selling fruits
and vegetables sector (FVEG) increases the probability of adopting a brand.
This contrasting result also holds for export markets and marketing channels. If exporting to
European markets (EXINEU) increases the adoption of both signals, the co-operatives export-
ing outside of the European Union borders (EXOUTEU) are less likely to choose a label. In
marketing channels, compared to the co-operatives network, transacting with a reduced number
of big partners like supermarket and wholesalers increases the probability of adopting a brand.
Whereas having different marketing channels (LT50SM, i.e. less than 50% of turnover with the
same marketing channel) increases the probability of adopting a common label.
The bivariate probit estimation leads to a contrasting result: on the one hand, the positive cor-
relation coefficient suggests a complementary effect, on the other hand the drivers of the quality
15Among the co-operatives, the processors are indeed the smallest (see footnote 1). But the dummy variable
control only of the fixed effect. For the slope, we have to consider a probit model counterpart to the Chow test
(Wooldridge, 2010). That is, suppose that the constant term and the coefficient of other explanatory variables are
the same whether PROC equals 1 or 0, against the alternative that an altogether different equation applies for
the two group of co-operatives, those with PROC = 1 and those with PROC = 0. The restricted model in this
instance would be based on the pooled data set of all 993 observations. The log-likelihood for the pooled model
(which has all the explanatory variables without PROC) is -548. The log-likelihoods for the model based on the
684 observations with PROC = 1 and the 304 observations with PROC = 0 are -405 and -157, respectively. The
log-likelihood for the unrestricted model with separate coefficient vectors is thus the sum, -562. The chi-squared
statistic for testing the restrictions of the pooled model is twice the difference, LR = 2[-548 - (- 562)] = 28. At the
5% significance level, the hypothesis that the coefficients of the explanatory variables are the same is rejected.
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signals (label and brand) suggest a substitutability effect. The estimation of the bivariate model
with correction for endogeneity bias (see model 4) does not significatively changed this result: only
the signs of some product variables and the dummy variable for processing co-operatives (PROC)
changed for the Label choice16. As explained above, this can be due to unobserved heterogeneity
that may bias the estimation results. To circumvent the problem, we can use exclusion restriction
and test indirectly for complementarity. This can be done by estimating a multinomial logit model
for the mutually exclusive signals.
- insert Table 4 -
5.2 The multinomial logit
We go further into the small co-operative choice for a particular quality signal. In order to do so we
apply the indirect test for complementarity that we described in the previous section. Under the
assumption that co-operatives make the best choice in quality signal we estimate a multinomial
logit model for their actual choices (NOSIG, LABEL, BRAND, LABRAND). We estimate the
following model of quality signal choice
Pr(Y = j) =
eXiβ∑4
i=1 e
Xiβ
with j ∈ {LABEL,BRAND,LABRAND,NOSIG} and Xi a vector of characteristics of co-
operative i. Co-operatives choosing no signal (NOSIG) serve as the reference case.
Notice that in contrast to the bivariate model alternatives are exclusive in the multinomial logit, i.e.
each co-operative can only belong to one of the four groups. This implies that the multinomial logit
model reveals drivers of exclusive combinations of the different quality signals, more particularly the
drivers of the mix signal (LABRAND). Indeed, while the bivariate probit restricts the coefficients
of the exogenous variables to be the same for all LABEL (BRAND) decisions, the multinomial
logit model allows coefficients to vary across exclusive alternatives.
This allows us to apply the indirect test for complementarity. Recall that this test relies on an
exclusion restriction that affects the use of one of the quality signals in isolation as well as the
combine use of both signals while not the use of the other signal in isolation. To apply the indirect
test for complementarity between signals we need some theoretical predictions. The literature on
16We also made the correction for the endogeneity bias of the variable SUBSID (see the multinomial logit, table
5) and the variable TURN. In a companion paper, we indeed estimate an ordered bivariate probit (Kaminski and
Thomas, 2011) where turnover and quality signals are simultaneously chosen. We find a clear and positive effect of
the turnover on the probability of choosing a quality signal.
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supermarkets (Liesbeth et al., 2004) provides us with a theoretical argument from an instrument
variable with a focus on brand. Compared to the other marketing channels, quality signals are
widespread and more diverse in supermarkets.
On one hand, suppliers have incentives to develop their own brand strategy to get a larger share
of the price premium paid by consumers. Supermarkets may also receive some profit from this
strategy since a brand signal is a credible commitment that the suppliers will provide a quality
good. This could help to sustain the supermarket reputation as a third party guarantor of quality
(Bigaiser 1993, Biglaiser and Friedman 1994). On the other hand, the development of brands
when transacting with supermarkets may also have an indirect effect by increasing the return of a
labeling strategy. Indeed, the suppliers have some incentives to use other signals to escape from the
brands competition with supermarkets that recently developed their own (retailer) brands (Berges
et al., 2013).
Another exclusion restriction is used in the brand case. Hayes et al. (2007) show that brand is the
more common signal in the fruit and vegetables sector. The fruit and vegetables market is very
competitive and thus less likely to the development of labels, with very few co-operatives able to
ensure a collective action on common labeling adoption and diffusion. But with the development of
the organic label (AB) in the fruit and vegetables short supply chains (Torre and Traversac, 2011),
co-operatives that have chosen a brand signal may also add the AB label on products coming from
organic farming. In this case, choosing a brand can also have an indirect effect in the probability
of adopting a label signal (e.g. organic label, AB).
Two further restrictions are used that center around labels. We expect that the label choice
depends on some specific governance of the co-operatives (Sykuta and Cook, 2001). That is, the
more a co-operative is associated or member of a union of co-operatives (UNION), the more it
will adopt a common label (Fillipi, 2010). This can be explained by the fact that the co-operative
does not usually have the full decision rights on its marketing strategies (Hendriksen and Bijman,
2002) and just follows the common labeling strategy of the union. But the larger the total sales
of the “small” co-operative, the higher its decision rights and thus its negotiation power inside
the union to develop (or maintain) its own signal strategy. For such co-operatives, it can indeed
be worthwhile to increase differentiation by using a mixed signal, i.e. adding a private signal on
common labeling.
The estimation results of the multinomial logit (without and with endogeneity bias correction; see
table 5) show that some of our exclusion restrictions for the indirect test do work. The supermar-
ket variable impacts the choice of brand in isolation as well as the joint use of label and brand
(LABRAND), while there is no impact on the choice of label only signal. In contrast if the retail-
ers (RET) and wholesalers (WS) variables significantly affect the probability of the mixed signal
(LABRAND), they do not significantly affect stand-alone signals (LABEL and BRAND). Hence,
we can conclude that choosing the supermarket as a marketing channel increases the expected
marginal returns from brand in the presence of labels (mixed signal).
Similarly, the results also show that making less than 50% of its turnover with the same marketing
channel also increases the marginal gains from brand when labels are chosen. The exclusion
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restrictions on labels, those builds on the governance of the co-operatives, also show that the level
of total sales (TURN) and the association/membership to an union are important for the label
signal, and that the marginal gains from this signal are higher if brands are in place. This last
result is however not robust to endogeneity bias correction since there is no significative impact of
the variables TURN and UNION on the mix signal adoption while they have a positive effect on
the brand choice. We also find no significative correlation between Union and subsidiary decisions
on one hand and the mix signal adoption on the other hand.
However, we find no significant effect for the other exclusion restriction on brand. If selling fruit
and vegetables increases the probability of choosing a brand, it has no significant effect on the
mixed signal adoption. Therefore, there is no indirect effect of selling fruit and vegetables on the
probability of choosing a label. This result is robust to endogeneity treatment.
The indirect test of complementarity using a multinomial logit does therefore not provide a con-
clusive result. For some exclusion restrictions, the indirect test shows that there is evidence of
complementarity but for one another there is no complementary effect.
- insert Table 5 -
5.3 The Multinomial Probit
In contrast to the previous models, where we have only indirect test of the complementary effect,
the multinomial probit is able to provide a reliable direct test of complementarity17.
As in the multinomial logit model, and in contrast to the bivariate probit, the multinomial probit
model is less restrictive on the effects that exogenous control variables can have on the different
choices, allowing coefficients to vary across exclusive combinations of quality signals. The dif-
ference is that for the mixed signal (LABRAND), the only explanatory variable is the constant,
which captures the complementary effect. Like the bivariate probit model, and in contrast to the
multinomial logit, it is possible to estimate a coefficient of correlation between the error terms,
which captures the unobserved heterogeneity.
Therefore, as discussed in section 3, with a multinomial probit we have a consistent model of
complementarity and we can account for the unobserved co-operative heterogeneity. It is indeed
possible to separate complementarity between the strategies from the unobserved heterogeneity,
since we can estimate both: (i) the parameter θ (the constant term in the regression), which cap-
tures complementarity; and (ii) the parameter ρ (the correlation coefficients between the errors),
17For the previous estimations, we used classic commands under Stata 13. To estimate our specific MNP model,
there is no such classic command either under STATA or under other econometric softwares. We developed our
own program under R using the MNP package.
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which captures the unobserved heterogeneity between co-operatives. This separation cannot be
done with the previous two models, i.e. bivariate and multinomial logit models.
The results of the multinomial probit estimation in table 4 indicate that there is complementar-
ity between quality signals, since the complementarity parameter (θ), captured by the constant
coefficient, is significant for the mixed signal choice (LABRAND). The complementarity here is a
substitution effect since the sign of the coefficient is negative (-6.44). This result implies that the
positive sign in the coefficient correlation found in the previous bivariate probit regression does not
captures a complementarity effect, but only some unobserved heterogeneity between co-operatives
that explain the mixed signal choice. Indeed, the coefficient of correlation in the multinomial
probit (ρ = 0.63) is positive and significant.
This finding on the substitution effect is consistent with the difference in the drivers of stand-
alone signals (LABEL and BRAND). While exporting inside of the EU (EXINEU) increases the
probability of adopting a label, exporting out of the European Union (EXOUTEU) reduces this
probability. This result is magnified by the regional effect and the origin of the product. Indeed,
making less than 50% total sales in the region (LT50INREG) reduces the probability of choosing
a label. In contrast, exporting out of the EU increases the probability of adopting a brand since
the positive sign of the coefficient turns to be significant in the multinomial probit, which was not
the case in the previous regressions.
This mainly shows that brand signal is made for export outside of the EU while labels are profitable
inside of the EU market. This is consistent with the idea that labels, mainly IGs and PDOs, have
an access to institutional recognition and protection from the European Union that make them
profitable. Outside the borders of the EU markets, this protection is less effective and consequently
the trademark system, and thus branding, is more efficient.
- insert Table 6 -
6 Conclusion
Many quality signals, mainly brands and common labels, have been developed to foster the devel-
opment of food quality in the agro-food markets. Previous research has typically focused on either
brand or common label efficiency independently, while in many instances both signals coexist.
Agricultural products pairing brand names and certified labels, such as indications of origin, are
indeed very common (e.g. Roquefort cheese, Scottish whiskeys and most of the French wines).
The objective of our paper is to take into account this coexistence by empirically analyzing the
complementarity and/or substitutability that may exist between labels and brands. To do so, we
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develop a multinomial probit model of complementarity that we test on a database of the quality
signaling strategies from 993 small French co-operatives. Our main result shows that there is a
clear interaction effect between brand and label signal strategies, but this is more a substitution
effect than a complementary one. The positive correlation that can be observed between both
signals is only due to the unobserved heterogeneity between co-operatives.
Given the lack of previous empirical work on this topic of coexistence of quality signals, the first
results generated by this research provide some interesting suggestions for further theoretical work
regarding the complementarity between quality signals. Introducing new questions in the survey,
e.g. on contracting and governance mechanisms of the co-operatives, may help to better control
for the unobserved heterogeneity. A panel data set on the different surveys on co-operatives signal
choices would allow us also to control for unobserved specific effects.
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Appendix: endogeneity problem
In our estimation, there may be an endogenity bias since a variable like UNION (being a member
or associated to an union of cooperative) may impact (negatively) the adoption of a brand signal
but also the error term. The obvious solution to the endogeneity problem is to include variables
that may control for the quality signalling decision inside the cooperative. But we do not have
such information in our database. The instrumental variable approach provides an alternative
solution. We introduce new sets of variables which the property that changes in these variables are
associated with changes in UNION but do not lead to changes in LABEL. The regression model
with the dependent variable y1 (LABEL) depends on one endogenous regressor, denoted by y2 and
exogenous regressors, denoted by x1:
y1 = β11x1 + β21y2 + ε1 (7)
where the regression errors u are assumed to be uncorrelated with xi but are correlated with y2.
A consistent estimator can be obtained if we assume that there are instruments x2 correlated with
y2 and that satisfy the assumption E(u |x2)| = 0. That is, y2 must satisfy the first stage equation
with only exogenous variables on the right-hand side.
y2 = α12x1 + α22x2 + ε2 (8)
Using the gross correlation between endogenous variable and instruments and between instruments,
we select a regional instrument for the endogenous regressor: south region in France (SOUTH)
where there is more Union of cooperatives than in other regions in France. We begin with 2SLS
IV regression of LABEL on the endogenous regressor UNION, instrumented by these two instru-
ments, and several exogenous regressors (model 2 in table 4). We also consider estimation of an
overidentified model with 2SLS estimation and by different variants of GMM. But there is very
small variations since the parameter of estimates have changed by less than 10% between the two
methods. To test for endogeneity, we compare if there is a significant difference between OLS and
IV estimators, by using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test with robust variance estimates (Davidson,
2000). The F-stat leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that UNION is exogenous. We conclude
that UNION is endogenous.
To account for the binary nature of the endogenous regressor UNION, we can change the first
stage equation to be a latent-variable y∗2 that determines whether y2 = 1 or 0. That is,
y∗2 = α12x1 + α22x2 + ε2
y2 =
{
1 if y∗2 > 0
0 otherwise
(9)
The errors (ε1, ε2) are assumed to be correlated bivariate normal with Var(ε1) = σ
2, Var(ε2) = 1
and Cov(ε1, ε2) = ρσ
2. And the binary endogenous regressor (y2) can be viewed as a treatment
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indicator. If y2 = 1, the cooperative receives treatment, i.e. it has access to UNION membership,
and if y2 = 0 , it does not receive treatment. We use the treatreg command in Stata to estimate
this model (model 3 in table 4) with the two instruments. Compared with IV estimation, we
have an increase precision of the estimation since the coefficient of UNION has increased from
-0.617 to -0.278 and the standard error has fallen greatly from 0.259 to 0.095. And the Wald
test of independence between error terms in the two equations (ρ = 0) shows that the exogeneity
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% threshold.
We want to go further and account also for the binary nature of the dependent variable LABEL.
Bhattacharya et al. (2006) show that the bivariate probit performs best in generating consistent
estimates of the treatment effect (in our case, the effect of union association/membership on
the probability of choosing a label). Since it can also be interesting to simultaneously estimate
the brand decision as well as the label decision, we estimate we estimate the following trivariate
recursive model (see model 4 in table 4)
y1 = β11y2 + β21x1 + ε1
y3 = β13y2 + β23x1 + ε3
y2 = α12x1 + α22x2 + ε2
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0, i = 1, ...3
0 otherwise
(10)
where εi are error terms distributed as multivariate normal, each with mean of zero, and a variance-
covariance matrix
∑
where values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations ρjk = ρkj as of diag-
onal elements. We estimate this recursive trivariate probit model using the multivariate (mvprobit)
command, with robust standard errors, in STATA. The mvprobit command uses the GHK simula-
tion method for maximum likelihood estimation of the multivariate probit regression model. The
results of the estimation with a correction of the endogeneity bias for the variable Union show two
things. First, its sign nor significativity have changed: it has still a non-significative impact on
Label and a positive and significative effect on Brand. Second, if the correlation parameter be-
tween Union and Label decisions is not significative, the one between Union and Brand is negative.
This may suggest that there are unobserved variables that have a positive impact on Union and a
negative impact on brand decision.
To correct for endogeneity bias in the multinomial logit model, we also used the multivariate probit
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approach. Following (11), we estimated a fifth-variate model
y1 = β11x1 + β21y2 + β31y3 + ε1
y4 = β14x1 + β24y2 + β34y3 + ε4
y5 = β15x1 + β25y2 + β35y3 + ε5
y2 = α12x1 + α22x2 + ε2
y3 = α13x1 + α23x2 + ε3
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0, i = 1, ...5
0 otherwise
(11)
where (y1, y4, y5) represent the three decision (observed) variables on quantity signaling (respec-
tively, LABRAND, BRAND, LABEL) and (y2, y3) the two endogenous variables (respectively,
UNION and Subsidiary).
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on Small French Co-operatives
All Nosig label brand mix
Nbre observations 993 293 475 50 175
% Associate/member of an union 40% 30% 46% 48% 40%
% Own a subsidiary 14% 11% 14% 14% 22%
Wholesaler 69% 51% 77% 80% 77%
Products
-Beverage 48% 36% 44% 68% 75%
-Crops 6% 15.5% 2% 2% 2.5%
-Fruits and Vegetables 7.5% 8% 6.5% 12% 7.5%
-Milk and oil 28.5% 23% 42% 8% 6%
-Meat 5% 5% 4.5% 7% 6%
-others 5% 13% 1% 4% 2%
Less than 50% of total sales in the same region 22% 19% 16% 42% 35%
More than 50% of total sales with the same marketing channel 86% 91.5% 85% 88.5% 79%
- with Cooperative network 30% 32.5% 33% 26% 17%
- with wholesalers 18% 12.5% 19% 24% 24.5%
- with Retailers 10% 15% 7% 8.5% 10%
- with Supermarkets 5% 3% 4% 16% 8.5%
- with Others (hostels, restaurants, ...) 23% 28.5% 22% 14% 19%
Average total sales turnover 1.99 1.86 1.94 1.90 2.35
Average number of members 98 117 74 141 120
Average number of employees 3.5 2.1 3.4 5.2 5.6
% exporting inside EU borders 20% 8.5% 16% 26% 44%
- Average % of total sales in export 12% 20.5% 11% 18% 9%
% exporting outside EU borders 5% 2% 3.5% 10% 12%
- Average % total sales in export 10% 52% 3.6% 7.5% 4.2%
Nosig: no quality signal; Mix: mix signal (label and brand jointly adopted)
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Table 2: Labels adopted
Label adoption Type of labels
no label 34%
at least one label 66% IGs (AOC, IGP) 81%
- 1 label 85% AB 12%
- 2 labels 12% Label Rouge 4%
- 3 labels 2% CCP 2%
- 4 labels 1% Others 1%
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Table 3: Description of variables
Variable Definition Mean S. D. Min. Max.
Size and structure
MEM Number of members 98.37 183.7 0.00 3200
EMP Number of employees (from 0 to 10) 3.53 3.64 0.00 10
UNION = 1 if Union association or membership 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
SUBSID = 1 if coop has a subsidiary 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
TURN Sales turnover (millions €) 1.99 2.88 0.00 31.3
Activity
PC = 1 if the coop is a processor; = 0 if its is a wholesaler 0.69 0.46 0.00 1.00
Products
MILKOIL = 1 if coop produces milk & oil (reference) 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
BEV = 1 if coop produces beverages 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
CER = 1 if coop produces cereals 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
FVEG = 1 if coop produces fruits & vegetables 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00
MEAT = 1 if coop produces meat 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
OTHERS =1 if coop produces other products 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
Export Markets
EXINEU % of turnover by exports within EU 0.35 0.89 0.47 4.60
EXOUTEU % of turnover by exports outside EU 0.06 0.39 0.39 4.60
Local Market
LT50INREG = 1 if less than 50% of total sales is made in the same region 0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00
Marketing Channels
LT50SM = 1 if ≤ 50% of total sales with the same marketing channel 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00
- Co-operative network = 1 if dealing with a coop network (ref) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00
- SUPER = 1 if dealing with supermarket 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
- RET = 1 if dealing with a retailer 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
-WS =1 if dealing with a wholesaler 0.18 0.18 0.00 1.00
- OTHERS HOT = 1 if dealing with hotels & restaurants 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00
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